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Abstract
It is proved that the irrelevance result of Poyago−Theotoky can be extended from the
linear−quadratic case to general inverse demand and cost functions. Hence, as long as firms
are profitable at the first−best, the optimal subsidy decentralizes it in mixed oligopoly
irrespecitve of whether the public firm maximizes welfare or profit and moves
simultaneously with private firms, or maximizes welfare and acts as a Stackelberg leader.
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In a recent contribution to this journal, Poyago-Theotoky (2001) proved an irrelevance
result for mixed oligopoly. This result showed that the optimal subsidy and equilibrium
output levels are identical irrespective of whether (i) the game is simultaneous with the
public firm choosing output to maximize welfare or (ii) the public firm is a Stackelberg
leader or (iii) all firms are profit maximizers. This result extended previous work of
White (1996).
The result of Poyago-Theotoky is, however, restricted to the case of linear
demand and a quadratic cost function with no fixed costs. At the end of the paper she
speculates that the result holds for general demand and costs. The purpose of this note is
to confirm that it does.
For the linear-quadratic case, Poyago-Theotoky proves the result by explicitly
calculating the equilibria. With general functions this is not possible. Instead, one is
pushed to consider the general reasoning behind the result. This actually leads to a much
simplified irrelevance proof.
2. The Framework
There is an industry composed of n private firms and one public firm producing an
homogeneous good. The outputs of the private firms are denoted  i q , i = 1,...,n, and that
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with a cost function  ( ) j q C . The consumer sector is described by the inverse demand
function  () Q p . These functions satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (i)  () 0 0 ≥ C ,  ( ) 0 ' ≥ j q C , (ii)  () 0 ' < Q p .
Each private firms maximizes profit
() () , i i i i sq q C Q p q + − = π   i = 1,…,n.        (1)
where s is the subsidy paid by the government. The profit level of the public firm is
() ( ) 0 0 0 0 sq q C Q p q + − = π .        (2)
Social welfare is defined by the sum of consumer surplus plus profits less the cost of the
subsidy. HencesQ CS W
n
i
i − ∑ + + =
= 1
0 π π .        (3)
For the mixed Nash equilibrium, each private firm chooses its output to maximize
profit (1) and the public firms chooses output to maximize (3). Every firm takes the
output of the others and the subsidy as given. In the private oligopoly equilibrium, the
objective of the public firm becomes the maximization of (2). All else remains the same.
The mixed Stackelberg equilibrium has the public firm as Stackelberg leader with (3) as
its objective. For all three cases the government chooses the subsidy to maximize welfare
taking into account how the subsidy affects the equilibrium choices of the firms.
Formally, in stage 1 the government sets a subsidy then, in stage 2, the firms play the
output game according to the rules specified.
Define the output level  * q  by
[] ( ) ( ) * * ' 1 q C q n p = + ,        (4)
Clearly,  * q  is the level of output that if produced by all firms leads to marginal cost
pricing. Given the assumptions on  ()⋅ ' C  and  ()⋅ p  it is also unique for fixed n. Next define
the subsidy
[] ( ) * * * 1 ' q n p q s + − = .        (5)
This is also uniquely identified. The following profitability assumption is imposed.
Assumption 2. (Profitability)  [] ( ) ( ) 0 1 * * * * * ≥ + − + q s q C q q n p .
This assumption guarantees that at the subsidy  * s , the firms can be profitable when
producing the marginal cost output level. As will be seen, this condition guarantees that
the first-best can be decentralized.
The central result of the paper is as follows.
Theorem Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any demand and cost functions such that an
equilibrium exists with equal positive output levels for the private firms, the equilibrium
output levels and the optimal subsidy are identical for all three cases. Furthermore, the
equilibrium is the first-best with price equal marginal cost.
3. Welfare
The basis of the proof is a reduction of the welfare function (3) to its simplest form. First
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Using (6), (1) and (2), welfare becomes
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Expressed in this way it can be seen that the direct effect of the subsidy nets out
and its only effect is via the changes in demand that it generates. The social objective is
therefore the maximization of surplus in excess of production cost. This is to be expected,
since all other values are simply transfers.
4. Mixed Nash and Private Oligopoly
Using (7) and (1), the first-order conditions describing the mixed Nash equilibrium
choice of outputs are
( ) ( ) 0 ' 0 = − m m q C Q p ,        (8)
and




m ,        (9)
where the superscript m denotes the equilibrium concept.
Correspondingly, using (2) and (1), the private oligopoly equilibrium solves
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ' ' 0 0 = + − + s q C Q p q Q p o o o o ,      (10)
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where the symmetry assumption implies  o
i
o q q = 0 , i = 1,…,n.
Setting  ( ) o o Q p q s ' 0 − =  equates these two sets of conditions and ensures
* q q q o
j
m
j = = , j = 0,...,n. This proves the irrelevance theorem for these two cases since
the first-best of  ' C p =  is assumed profitable and can therefore be decentralized..
5. Stackelberg
In the case of Stackelberg equilibrium the first-order condition for each private firm is






, of the followers. Hence
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Applying the optimal subsidy, (1) reduces to  () () 0 ' ' = − i q C Q p  for all i = 1,…,n,
and hence (12) becomes
() ( ) 0 ' ' 0 = − q C Q p .      (13)
These are again the same equilibrium conditions as for mixed Nash and private oligopoly.
This proves the theorem.
6. Conclusions
The analysis has extended the irrelevance result of Poyago-Theotoky (2001) to allow for
general inverse demand and cost functions. This more general setting has actually lead to
a simpler proof. The reason for this is that linearity of the demand function encourages
consumer surplus to be written as the well-known  2
2
1
Q  (see equation (3) of Poyago-
Theotoky). This obscures the fact that expenditure, pQ, can be eliminated from the
expression for welfare to obtain the simpler form given in (7) from which the results
follow naturally.
The assumptions used here seem to be the most general for which the irrelevance
holds. The only asymmetry possible is to add a number of firms that produce zero output
at the first-best equilibrium. Any other asymmetry will not allow the first-best to besustained for all firms simultaneously. If non-uniqueness of equilibrium were introduced
the theorem would have to be weakened to the claim that the first-best (plus the other
equilibria) could be decentralized, though no guarantee could be offered that it would
actually arise.
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